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VIII. Limitations on the Corporate Lawyer's and Law
Firm's Freedom to Serve the Public Interest
By STEPHEN J. FRIEDMAN*

AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROBLEM

A young associate in a large law firm is interested in spending some of
his time helping persons who are not able to afford lawyers. The firm has
agreed that its associates can spend a portion of their time on pro bono
work. Each pro bono case must be treated as a firm client in order to insure
application of the firm's usual procedures for identifying conflict-of-interest
problems and to provide some level of supervision to maintain the quality
of the work. This young associate proposes to take on as clients a group of
blacks who are interested in enhancing employment opportunities for blacks
in large corporations in the city in which the firm is located.
The associate plans to make Molto Corporation, a publicly-held steel
fabricator, the prime target for his campaign. Molto is a large employer.
Among the tactics the associate plans to use are:

1. Initiating a shareholder proposal in order to bring the failure of
Molto to hire a substantial number of blacks to the attention of Molto
shareholders.
2. Bringing an action charging discrimination in employment before
the Human Relations' Commission.
3. Commencing a class action for damages for alleged violation of
the State Fair Employment Practices Act. No case as yet provides or
has recognized the existence of a private action for the violation of
this statute, but the associate has constructed some ingenious arguments to support his clients' claim.
4. Drafting legislation which will make it harder for companies like
Molto to avoid hiring blacks.
The president of a large general client of the !irm has heard of the proposed activities and has called the senior partner to express his displeasure.
He said that the tactics which the associate is developing could be used
against his company and that the legislation to be drafted would be applicable
to his company. He insists that the Human Relations Commission applies
affirmative action standards in a "mindless way," that his company requires
highly experienced workers and that the application of affirmative action
standards to his company would seriously damage its efficiency. Accord-
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ingly, he asserts that participation by the firm or someone associated with it
in such activities is unethical, and demands that the associate be forbidden
to proceed.
This problem identifies important ethical and practical questions faced by
most large law firms today: how to reconcile the commitment to serve the
public interest of the firm and its lawyers with the increasingly widespread
obligations the firm owes to an expanding group of regular clients-both
paying and pro bono clients. The problem also pinpoints some issues that
are too often ignored or ill-defined: conflicts between the interests of two
or more clients that arise from one client's desire that the firm not take a
specific position on a legal issue on behalf of another client or not assist another client in working toward a particular end. Here we will find, I think,
that the essence of the difficulty is not found in the pro bono nature of the
work, but in the differing interests of two clients, a state of affairs that can,
and does, crop up in ordinary practice all the time.
At the end of this short piece I will return to the facts of the problem outlined above and explain how I believe the questions posed should be answered. But before doing so, I would like to explore more deeply some of
the components of the prob1em.l The discussion below attempts to sort out
different ethical and professional considerations that in ordinary practice are
often viewed as a whole. This is not to say that the lawyer must review a
checklist whenever he makes a decision on a conflict problem, but the process
of sorting and analysis may give us greater understanding of the complexity
of the decision we must make. Indeed, the range of ethical and human considerations involved is so wide that they can be resolved only by an intuitive
judgment. Analysis can do no more than illuminate the problem and inform
our judgment. Consider, for example, the following basic questions that are
raised by the problem described above:
1. In the absence of a conflict, must the pro bono case be accepted
as a matter of professional obligation?
2. If there is a professional obligation to accept pro bono work, how
does that obligation weigh in the balance if there is some conflict with
an existing client?
3. If there is no professional obligation to accept a particular pro
bono client, is the firm free to give additional weight in striking a balance of potentially conflicting interests to the fact that the pro born
client is serving the public interest?
1. Although I refer at some length to the Code of Professional Responsibility and
its predecessor, Canons of Professional Ethics, I take it to be the purpose of this paper
to explore the ways in which the legal profession ought to deal with the kind of problems under discussion; how to treat issue conflicts among existing clients and how seriously to take them when one is considering whether to take on a new client. For that
reason I have used the standard materials and cases on professional ethics when I
thought it appropriate, but I have not felt bound by them.
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4. Assuming that there is no obligation to accept or reject the pro
bono client, is it inappropriate for a lawyer to turn it down because of
fear of losing the general client? Or is it inappropriate to bullishly ignore the wishes of the general client?
IS THERE A DUTY TO ACCEPT THE PRO BONO CLIENT?

I start from the proposition that ordinarily a lawyer has no obligation to
accept employment by any particular client-assuming that there is no prior
relationship that creates a duty and that the prospective client can find adequate counsel e l s e ~ h e r eNonetheless,
.~
it is clear that a lawyer or a firm has
a professional obligation of some kind to take on pro bono work.3 I would
like to devote a little time to exploring the concept of pro bono legal work
and the CDntOUrS of any obligation to perform it.
It is important to focus separately on the nature of specifically legal pro
born work and on the relationship between that concept and the nature of
the client's endeavors. Is it the essence of legal services rendered pro bono
public0 that they are made available without charge? Or that they are made
available to a person who would not otherwise have access to them? Or is
it that the client, and therefore the lawyer, is pursuing what is perceived to be
the interest of a broad group of people-a public interest-rather than his
own economic interests? Access to a lawyer's skills is important to most
people who undertake any complex economic or organizational endeavor in
our society and essential to those who seek to establish and vindicate fundamental legal rights. It is from his possession of this scarce and important social resource that a lawyer's special public responsibilities derive. The public
service aspect of the rendering of legal assistance does not flow from the
client's activities or objectives, but from the fact that legal services have
been made available to a person or group that needs them. Representation
of an indigent criminal defendant whose sole objective is to escape serious
2. Ethical Consideration 2-26 of the Code provides, in part, that "A lawyer is under
no obligation to act as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his
client; but in furtherance of the objective of tmhe bar to make legal services fully available, a lawyer should not lightly decline preferred employment." Note that the Ethical Considerations are viewed in the Code as "aspirational in character and [that they]
represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive."
On the other hand, the "Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are
mandatory in character." While Disciplinary Rule 2-110 deals with the question of
withdrawal from employment, neither it nor any other Disciplinary Rule addresses the
question of a lawyer's obligation to accept employment.
3. Canon 2 of the Code is very clear: "A lawyer should assist the legal profession
in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel av,ailable." And see Ethical Consideration
2-25: "The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay
ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer and personal involvement in the problems
of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload,
should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged." Again, the Disciplinary
Rules under Canon 2 contain no references to an obligation to make legal services available.
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punishment for a crime committed is pro bono work because our legal system requires that each player have counsel in order for the system to function
properly.
I would assert that the notion of pro bono legal services extends no further. All else is simply the lawyer preferring to associate himself with one
client rather than another. The lawyer may be totally committed to the ends
his client seeks to further-prison reform, equality of education or the defense of restrictive zoning or discriminatory private schools. He may prefer to devote his services to one of those ends rather than to further the
economic ends of a business enterprise. And indeed, perhaps we could all
agree that he is seeking to serve the public interest. But he does so as a human
being contributing his services-which happen to be legal services-in the
same way that the community organizer bends his community organization
skills to the urban renewal effort and the dietician serves the soup kitchen4
I do not make less of the lawyer's commitment for saying that it flows from
his moral rather than his professional being. It is simply that he is not required to devote himself to a public interest project by his professional re~ponsibilities.~
Is it mere quibbling to draw a distinction between a lawyer's obligations
as a lawyer and his obligations as a human being? T o the contrary, the distinction may sometimes be critical. By becoming a lawyer, a man subjects
himself to a special set of obligations and restrictions that apply to the exercise of his professional function and that are not applicable to the general
population. Thus, he cannot put himself in the kind of conflict-of-interest situation that may be perfectly acceptable to businessmen of high moral character. There are special rules applicable to the way in which he deals with
the money of others. And there are many other examples. Within that system
of limited restrictions and obligations, its own rules are accorded a higher
weight in making professional decisions than ethical precepts applicable to
4. Note that I am not here entering the debate on the question whether the public
interest is best served by the lawyer's narrow pursuit of the interests of his client or
whether he should make independent judgments as to where the public interest lies.
See Krash, Professional Responsibility T o Clients And The Public Interest: Is There A
Conflict?, 55 Chi. Bar Record 31 (1974), which appears in a superb collection of materials on problems of the legal profession, Kaufman, Problems in Professional Responsibility (Little, Brown and Company 1976). See also Professor Fried's interesting exploration of this problem, Fried The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations Of The
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1976).
5. The notion that a lawyer has an obligation to serve.the public interest other than
by simply making his services available to those for whom legal services would not
otherwise be available would be perfectly workable if it were set forth in a general way,
giving the lawyer considerable latitude for choice among public causes. But if the
precept were refined so as to give any particular "public interest" client a claim on a
lawyer's time, many fascinating questions arise. For example, does the former A C i U
lawyer have an obligation to represent an organization devoted to the defense of individual rights in the form of restrictive zoning? Or does the foundation established by a
great American corporation, both paying clients, have a greater claim to representation than the corporation?
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the population as a whole. For example, a lawyer may find himself dutybound to approach the borderline of lack of candor in defending the interests
of the criminal defendant, although he would not think of doing so in his
personal life.6 The number of positive rules of this character is few, since
the Code's Ethical Considerations are "aspirational in character," the area
of freedom of choice accorded to a lawyer is great. It is in exercising that
freedom of choice that nonprofessional ethical precepts, including notions
of public service, become operative.
This distinction takes on a special importance in the context of the problems this paper addresses. For the nature of the conflict is itself very unclear.
As the discussion below indicates, I think we can begin to address the seriousness with which we take the conflict by thinking about the "legitimacy" of
the existing client's expectations. Since that kind of a notion inevitably involves many fuzzy lines, a lawyer may well find himself weighing the possible
existence of a professional obligation to the existing client against an obligation he feels to accept the proffered employment by the pro bono client.
I believe that, in doing so, he may only properly take into account an obligation that derives from a professional as opposed to a more generalized ethical
source. Conversely, suppose the lawyer decides that the existing client's assertion of a conflict does not, as a matter of professional ethics, require him
to turn down the pro bono client? Nevertheless, he would like to do so, perhaps for fear that his angry general client will go elsewhere. In thinking
about whether or not it is appropriate for the lawyer to accede to the wishes
of his existing client even though he is not required to do so, he must think
about whether he has a professional obligation to accept the prospective
pro bono client. In short, when conflicts of interest are involved, the lawyer
must give precedence to his professional obligations.
Assuming that a lawyer has some obligation to do pro bono work, he must
inquire whether he has any obligation to do pro bono work for a particular
client. Expressions of a lawyer's obligation to perform pro bono services are
usually couched in general terms.7 He is enjoined, in effect, to "do his part."
A cynic might conclude that this generalized formulation was chosen to
make it clear that the lawyer really has no social obligations. That objective may have motivated some segments of the organized bar. But the generality also derives, I think, from the fact that it is difficult to determine, with
respect to any particular person, whether legal services are really unavail6 . See Freedman, Professional Responsibility O f The Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469 (1966); Frankel, The Search For
Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U . Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1975); Rotunda, Book Review
o f Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1976).
7. "Nevertheless, persons unable to pay all or a portion of a reasonable fee should
be able to obtain necessary legal services, and lawyers should support and participate in
ethical activities designed to achieve that objective." Ethical Consideration 2-16. "The
fulfillment of this objective [to make legal services fully available] requires acceptance
by a lawyer o f his share of tendered employment which may be unattractive both to
him and the bar generally." [Emphasis added] Ethical Consideration 2-26.
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able. So long as most segments of the bar "do their part" in doing some pro
bono work, chances are that there will be a lawyer for many prospective
clients, even though the overall supply of free legal services may be insufficient. Thus, individual responsibility is diluted and the obligation becomes
merely one to "do your part." A former President of the American Bar Association has suggested that a lawyer can "do his part" by simply contributing money.8 And, indeed, the problem of providing legal services has increasingly come to be viewed as a social problem to be solved by governmental action and funding. If this generalized notion of public responsibility
holds, then perhaps a lawyer is not required to give special weight to the pro
bono client in weighing a potential conflict of interest.
'How about the public interest organization? Is there a professional obligation to accept as a client any particular applicant? For the reasons set forth
above, I do not believe any such obligation stems from the nature of the
ends sought by the organization. Could it stem from the lack of legal services
available to the organization? There are those who say that the appetite for
litigation of the typical environmental protection organization or civil rights
organization cannot be satisfied. Whether or not that is the case, there are
many such organizations that could convincingly argue that, with additional
legal manpower, they could prosecute much more worthwhile public interest
litigation. Is the lawyer obligated to help because this is a person to whom
legal services are not available? To do so would be to turn the lawyer into
a kind of super public utility, required to render services without cost to
persons whose end they may abhor. Moreover, there are important differences between a lawyer's obligation to represent an indigent criminal defendant who cannot afford legal counsel and the situation under consideration. .The traditional notions of a lawyer's obligations evolved in a context
very different from the pro bono cases of today. The basic ideas were elaborated in the context of the lawyer shielding the individual from the oppressions of the State: representing criminal defendants, defending seditious
libel actions and the like. In that case the lawyer acts in the courtroom, a
specifically legal forum, to protect a victim of State oppression.
The kind of action contemplated by the associate in our problem is quite
different. There the oppressor is not the State but industry. The victim is
not an individual but the public. The forum may be the courtroom or an administrative agency, but it may also be the public press. The wrong is illegal
anti-social activity that violates the civil rights of others: pollution, discriminatory hiring policies that result in the unfair allocation of economic goods,
unsafe products, price fixing and the like. In classic political theory, defense
of the public interest is a State function, but in our society we have decreased
the public expense, and perhaps raised efficiency levels, by permitting private
persons to bring class actions and other lawsuits on behalf of the public.
8. Statement by Chesterfield Smith appeari& in 60 ABAJ 641 (1974).
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Here the public interest has a legal sword in hand. Some may think that the
difference between helping in defense and helping in offense is meaningless.
But it is not entirely so. First, the institution of offensive litigation is a voluntary act, and providing free legal services takes away the economic discipline,
which I think is healthy, of having to weigh the costs of resorting to litigation
against its benefits. It has the corollary effect of significantly multiplying the
amount of litigation in our society, a trend which I do not favor. Second, the
private enforcement of public rights is still only supplementary to the basic
State function of protecting the public interest, and is not the only source
of help (just as the existence of legal aid societies decreases the lawyer's obligation to take on criminal defense work for the poor). Third, our society
is moving in the direction of providing economic incentives for lawyers to
litigate such cases. The mere availability of class actions creates a major incentive. And some statutes now permit the court to award attorneys' fees.O
In sum, I do not believe there is a professional obligation for a lawyer to
agree to represent any particular pro bono client, except under special circumstances.
WHAT IS THE LAWYER'S

D U N TO HIS EXISTING CLIENT?

Let us turn to the other side of the equation, the lawyer's obligations to
his existing client. What is the ethical significance of the facts in our problem
that the client is a paying client, an existing client and a general client? The
foregoing discussion has suggested, I am sure, my conclusion that the fact
that it is a paying client puts it on no lower or higher ground than other
clients. A lawyer has no lesser responsibility to a client that is a business organization than an organization devoted to the public good. It is a professional relationship we are discussing, and once established, it must be the
same for all clients within the scope of the relationship. The remaining two
factors, however, give this client significant clai,ms on the lawyer.
It is of the utmost importance that it is an existing client; the lawyer may
not easily sever that relationship, and may not be able to do so at all if there
is any detriment to the client involved.1° For my part, Professor Fried has
put it best:
9. But see, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 420
(1975).
10. See, e.g., Ethical Consideration 2-32: "A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should
be made only on the basis of compelling circumstances, and in a matter pending before
a tribunal he must comply with the rules of the tribunal regarding withdrawal. A lawyer should not withdraw without considering carefully and endeavoring to minimize
the possible adverse effect on the rights of his client as a result of his withdrawal.
. ." Moreover, in this case the Disciplinary Rule comes close to the aspirational standard. Disciplinary Rule 2-1 10(A) (2) provides that "a lawyer shall not withdraw from
employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the
rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing time for employment of other counsel
and complying with applicable laws and rules."

.

...
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How does a professional fit into the concept of personal relations at
all? He is, as I have suggested, a limited-purpose friend. A lawyer is
a friend in regard to the legal system. He is someone who enters into
a personal relation with you-not an abstract relation as under the
concept of justice. That means that like a friend he acts in your interest,
not his own; or rather he adopts your interests as his cwn. I would call
that the classic definition of, friendship. To be sure, the lawyer's range
of concern is sharply limited. But within that limited domain the intensity of identification with the client's interest is the same.ll
. . . The lawyer-client relation is a personal relation, and legal counsel is a personal service. This explains why, once the relation has been
contracted, considerations of efficiency or fair distribution [of scarce
legal resources] cannot be allowed to weaken it. The relation itself is
not a creature of social expediency . . . it is the creature of moral
right, and therefore expediency may not compromise the nature of the
relation.12
TYPES OF CONFLICTS AND THE SOURCE OF A LAWYERS OBLIGATION

I would like to discuss briefly the extent which the Code of Professional
Responsibility bears on the kind of conflict questions posed by our problem
and then turn to a somewhat broader consideration of the conflict problem
in light of the fact that the existing client is also a general client.
Disciplinary Rule 5-105 deals directly with the subject of accepting or
continuing employment when the interests of another client are affected. Subdivisions ( A ) and (B) of that Disciplinary Rule prohibit a lawyer from accepting or continuing employment if either "the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely t o be adversely
affected by the $[otherclient], or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests," except, in either case, as permitted by subdivision (C). That subdivision permits a lawyer to represent multiple interests
if "it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if
each consents to the representation after a full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of [the lawyer's] independent professional judgment on behalf of each." When the relations of two clients are
truly adverse, it is hard to see how a lawyer can adequately represent the
interests of each. Nevertheless, the Code recognizes that, outside of the courtroom, lawyers believe they have considerably more latitude to represent
clients with "differing interests." Ethical Consideration 5-15 reflects this
approach :

A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with
differing interests; and there are few situations in which he would be
11. Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations O f The Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060, 1071-72 (1976).
12. Id. at 1077.

Heinonline - - 3 3 Bus. L a w . 1 4 8 2 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 8

Limitations on Sewing the Public Interest

1483

justified in representing in litigation multiple clients with potentially
differing interests. . . . On the other hand, there are many instances
in which a lawyer may properly serve multiple clients having potentially
differing interests in matters not involving litigation. If the interests vary
only slightly, it is generally likely that the lawyer will not be subjected
to an adverse influence and that he can retain his independent judgment on behalf of each client; and if the interests become dzering,
withdrawal is less likely to have a disruptive effect upon the causes of
his clients.
The Code defines "differing interests" as including "every interest that will
adversely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client,
whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse or other interest." This
definition departs from the formulation in Canon 6 of the predecessor ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics, which spoke of "conflicting" interests. Canon
6 provided that a lawyer represents conflicting interests "when, in behalf of
one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him ,to oppose." Although the "definition" inches in the direction
of giving meaning to the term "differing interests" it does not help us very
much in deciding about the disposition of the kind of asserted conflicts represented by our problem: situations in which one client is not the subject of
a litigation but desires a particular result in that litigation because of a belief
that its interests would be adversely affected by the legal rule sought to be
established or the other action proposed to be taken. Consider the following
list of conflicts that may arise in the kind of situation posed by the problem:
Direct Conflict. The general client is the direct object of the proposed actions: the defendant in a lawsuit or administrative proceeding,
the specific object of legislation or the subject of proposed stockholder
action.
Formal Issue Conflict.The lawyer would be required to take a public and formal position on an issue of law that is contrary to the position
the lawyer has taken or will take in the same or a similar f o r m . Examples of this abound: arguing both sides of the same issue before the
United States Supreme Court or an administrative tribunal, or within
the same Federal judicial circuit, or even perhaps with the same third
party in negotiations.
Object of Specific Regulation. Here the pro bono client seeks enforcement of the law or new laws or regulations that are applicable to
a specific segment of the population of which the general client is part;
for example, strip-mining laws where the general client is a mining
company, or anti-pollution laws when the general client discharges
substantial quantities of pollutants, or drug regulation and drug companies and the like.
Object of General Regulation. ,Here the laws are applicable to vir-
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tually every economic enterprise, in part because they are so written
and in part because the conduct they regulate is common to most
enterprises.
Disagreement with Social Objectives. In this situation the general
client is either unaffected by the regulation or affected only as a member of the general population. Its concern arises from a disapproval of
the objectives for which the pro bono client is working. Thus there are
those who do not want "their" lawyer helping the Communists or the
pornographers or those who attack restrictive zoning.
We know that in a direct conflict the lawyer may not act. And where the
client merely disagrees with the lawyer's social objectives, we sense that the
client is not justified in seeking to impose its will. But within those extremes,
how far must a lawyer go in accepting an assertion by his client that a conflict of interest exists? A lawyer has a professional obligation to observe what
we might call the legitimate expectations of his client about the consequences
of the professional relationship they have established, and the nature of the
relationship is the source of legitimacy. Preserving those expectations preserves many of the essential elements of a successful and desirable lawyerclient relationship: trust, confidence, respect and a generalized belief that
the lawyer is not furthering any interest that adversely affects the client.
A moment's reflection suggests that the nature of a client's legitimate
expectations varies at least in part with the range of the lawyer's services.
If the lawyer has been retained only to reduce a real estate assessment on
a plant or defend a negligence case, the client's claim on his undivided
loyalty is thin. If the lawyer is consulted about every large and small problem, he may be so privy to the client's affairs and secrets that the claim is
broad indeed. In terms of archetypes, the limited relationship is symbolized
by the role of the classic English barrister. The contrasting archetype is that
of the classical outside American general counsel, the lawyer (and firm)
that has broad and multilayered interactions with the client stretching over
tens of years.
It is useful to examine these archetypes in more detail. The image of the
litigator rooted in the English barrister tradition is of a professional retained
on an isolated matter to exercise his special skills on the client's behalf in an
arena where the client is a subsidiary actor; essentially independent, but cast
in a role in which his function is to pursue his client's interests singlemindedly, his zealousness proceeds not so much from identification with
his client as from the proper performance of his function in the adversary
system; because he is independent, his duty of fealty runs only so far as the
system dictates-and when the system dictates that he be candid and forthright with the court, his obligations to his client fall away; there is, in theory,
no conflict between the two duties.
Contrast this with the paradigm of the outside general counsel; the law
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fum's relationship with the client is quite different: it stretches over a long
period of time and has been shaped by countless problems, victories, crises,
disagreements and good times; it may be institutional, with one or more
partners and a larger number of associates dealing with many levels of management; unlike the courtroom, which is the lawyer's home territory in which
the lawyer has the "line responsibility," here the lawyer performs more of a
staff function-he is adviser, moral force, technician and sometimes counterweight; and the lawyer identifies with his client because of the nature of his
relationship, not only because of his institutional role. Notice that here there
is no true counterpart of the litigator's role as an officer of the court. The
corporate lawyer's moral standards and sense of self-esteem may prompt
him to be candid and fair, but there is no institutional obligation for him to
be so. The duration and breadth of this relationship strongly affects both the
lawyer's perception of himself and the client's perception of him-and in
about the same way.13
CONFLICTS AND "LEGITIMATE" EXPECTATIONS

Is it really meaningful to talk about the legitimacy of a client's expectations in matters as important as conflicts of interests? Is this notion really
a guide to conduct, or is it merely a ground for argument with the client?
I think it is of some use, because what we are considering is the client's sense
of betrayal, and like all emotional claims, we must h d a way to make a
judgment about it.
In the case of a general client, the personal relationships are much closer
(and therefore the potential claim for loyalty much broader) than in a
more isolated transaction. Also, the client has a tendency to view his lawyer
as "part of his team," a conception that leads to an ever broader claim of
loyalty. And that conception is not one-sided. Many corporate lawyers, for
wholly understandable reasons, come increasingly to identify themselves
with their clients. This tendency is one that most lawyers feel they must resist
to some degree. The identification often becomes centered on the person of
the chief executive officer, and the lawyer's obligation to serve "the corporation" may lie elsewhere. Even identifying with the corporation in general
13. The breadth of the law firm's relationship with a general client is relevant not
only to the problem bf Canon 5 and conflicts; it also bears on the application of Canon
4, which requires a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client, and
prohibits their revelation to third parties. Disciplinary Rule 4-101 defines a "secret"
as information the disclosure of which would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
If the position of the pro bono group is in some sense adverse to that of the general
client, then the vast amount of information that the firm has acquired about the affairs
of the client may make it impossible to know when secrets are being used. For example,
if the pro bono group wishes to draft banking legislation, to what degree does prior
general representation of a bank necessarily mean that the knowledge about where
the industry's skeletons are buried involves the revelation of a client's secret? If that
is a problem, does the same problem arise if the lawyer becomes Comptroller of the
Currency?
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may distort the measured advice that a corporate lawyer must give, for it
is not unusual for him to be required to advise that the law requires some
action, such as disclosure of a serious cash flow problem, that all would agree
will damage the ability of the company to carry on its business and depress
the market value of the current stockholders' investment in the company,
What then is the scope of the general client's legitimate expectations about
his lawyer's loyalty. Certainly in the case of what I have called a "direct
conflict," in which the general client is to be the object of the proposed
action, the lawyer should not accept the second client and the Code probably
forbids it in all cases. At the other extreme, it is not proper for a lawyer to
be influenced in his professional judgments by the wishes of anyone, including existing clients. Thus, the fact that a general client does not like the
objectives of the pro bono group should be disregarded-the client may not
legitimately expect his lawyer to follow his wishes in that regard.14
Is it wrong for a lawyer to "cave in" to even extreme expectations? Certainly if the pro bono group has been accepted as a client, the relationship
may not be terminated because of the disapproval of another client. If the
question is whether the proffered employment of the pro bono group should
be accepted, and assuming that the circumstances are such that the lawyer
has no professional obligation to the pro bono group, it is my view that he
should have no professional obligation to accept the group as a client. The
decision is one which, as a matter of professional ethics, he should be free
to make either way, although as a matter of "aspiration" I would hope the
lawyer would not be influenced by his client's wishes.
What, then, of the cases in the middle? I would assimilate to direct conflicts both issues conflicts and situations where the general client is part of
a subgroup, such as a regulated industry, that is the object of the proposed
action. The case of the regulated industry is relatively clear. There is a kind
of adversary relationship between a regulated industry and the regulations,
and I think a general client is entitled to feel that his lawyer will not work
to refine and tighten the regulations, even if that area of regulation is not
within the area in which the law firm functions.15
The question of issue conflicts is more fraught with problems. If it is
simply a matter of taking a position in court on behalf of one client that is
different from the position taken in the same or a related court on behalf of
another client, most of a s would agree [$hat a client has good reason to
14. See, e.g., Ethical Consideration 2-27: "A lawyer should not decline representation because a client or cause is unpopular. . . ."
15. But see Ethical Consideration 7-17: "The obligation of loyalty to his client applies only to a lawyer in the discharge of his professional duties and implies no obligation to adopt a personal viewpoint favorable to the interest or desires of his client.
While a lawyer must act always with circumspection in order that his conduct will not
adversely affect the rights of a client in a matter he is then handling, he may take
positions on public issues and espouse legal reforms he favors without regard to the
individual views of any client."
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object. But if this idea is extended much beyond the courtroom or administrative tribunal, it carries many subtle permutations that cannot be resolved
by general principles. For example, many firms represent both financial
institutions that lend money and general clients that borrow. If a non-client
lender seeks to realize on a security interest granted by a general client borrower, is it wrong for the lawyer to attack the validity of the whole security
arrangement, even though it is widely used and has been used by that firm
in behalf of its lender clients? I suspect most lawyers would conclude that
it is not improper for the firm to do so. But it is an extremely uncomfortable
situation. Would it make a difference if the law firm had "invented" the
security arrangement?
Suppose the second client is in the business of attacking the interests of
the first client? I understand that many law firms that specialize in bankruptcy work believe they must represent only creditors or only debtors,
but not both. And the conflict is even more likely in the case of pro bono
groups that specialize in a particular industry of which a general client is
part. Here the likelihood of a direct issue conflict is so great that a lawyer
should not put himself in the position of taking on the pro bono group.
That leaves the vague class of cases where the client is part of the general
population. The facts of each case will, of course, play a major role in determining whether a case falls in this group. In most cases, I would put here
antidiscrimination rules, securities laws (insofar as they apply to issuers),
corporate laws, the antitrust laws, ERISA and the like. I do not think a
general client has the right to expect its firm to refuse to act for the plaintiff
in a class action asserting a violation of the securities laws, except perhaps
if the lawyer knows that the legal principles involved bear directly on a
situation affecting the general client or some other direct issue conflict. In
effect, the client is doing no more than asserting his dislike for the closing
circle of laws and regulations that circumscribe our conduct. He is entitled
to his views, but should not expect that he can impose them on his lawyer.
It is a corollary of this analysis that I do not believe that the differences,
posed in the problem that began this paper, between established law and new
law, or among legislation, litigation and administrative actions, ought to be
given much weight. There are differences, but they are too fine for our purposes. We are dealing with a highly emotional human transaction-a client's
sense of betrayal. It can be dealt with in part by education in advance and
in part by the moral strength of the lawyer's position. Neither admit of line
distinctions.
Turning, then, to the problem with which we began, I would conclude that
the firm could properly tell its general client that it will accept the pro bono
group. May it decide otherwise? Assuming it has no special obligations to
the pro bono group, I think it would be justified in doing so.
Suppose there were special facts that created an issue conflict of some sort
with the general client. May the firm take on the pro bono group anyway,
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building a "Chinese wall" between the associate and the group of lawyers
that represent the general client? Disciplinary Rule 5-104(D)expressly forbids that course, and that result accords with good practice. As m s grow
larger, the possibility of conflicts of interest among existing clients, and of
taking on a new client with interests adverse to some existing client, multiply.
This is not a reason to relax procedures designed to avoid and resolve conflicts, but to intensify them. One cannot pass off a professional problem with
the idea that the "young associate" is somehow not associated. And that is
particularly true in the case of a general client that may deal with many
lawyers throughout the firm.There is a significant sense in which the firm
is the client's lawyer, and that institutional relationship cannot be disregarded.
Although I have concluded that the firm has a good deal of latitude on
the facts of our problem, my analysis leaves the firm with a good deal less
freedom than I would like. I would have preferred a conclusion that exalted
the "hired gun" aspects of the legal profession, leaving the lawyer free to
apply his skills on behalf of whomever he desires, subject only to avoiding
direct conflicts of interest. Alas, I think that conclusion is not consistent with
the corporate lawyer's obligations to his general client. The intimacy of that
relationship is a precious part of the practice of corporate law, and a lawyer
should not be required to sacrifice it.
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Introduction by Professor Robert H. Mundheim *
THISMORNING'S program will cover a potpourri of problems, and our first
speaker of the morning, Steve Friedman, will begin by analyzing the conflicts between the interests of two or more clients that arise from one client's
desire that the law firm not take a specific position on a legal issue on behalf
of another client or not assist another client in working toward a particular end.

* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School (currently Professor
Mundheim is serving as The General Counsel of the U. S. Treasury).
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Supplemental Remarks by Mr. Friedman:
I THINK that, before beginning to actually summarize some of the analysis
that I tried to do in this paper, it would be worthwhile to emphasize two
facts. The first is that what we are dealing with here is not what a lawyer
wants to do or the way we would like him to act, but a relatively narrow
set of prescriptive rules that require him to act in a certain way, i.e., rules
that tell him that he must or may not do something, which are also preeminent in the sense that they take precedence over general moral or ethical
precepts in general. Accordingly it is important that we think very carefully
about how to go about solving these problems.
While the Code of Professional Responsibility begins to address them,
it is very obvious that the range of combinations and permutations of factual
situations is enormous here, and accordingly I have a great preference for
Andy Kaufman's inductive approach to begin to deal with these problems.
I think we need to talk about them a great deal and talk about them publicly
before we can begin to formulate.principles that are truly meaningful.
Secondly, I think it is worthwhile to emphasize that what we are dealing
with is not conflict of interest, but conflict of obligations and the conflicts of
the lawyer's obligation. Loeber Landau told me a story last night about a
conversation he had with a lawyer who seemed to be representing two clients
with very different interests. Loeber raised the question with the lawyer about
how he could do that, and the lawyer said, "Well, I have no confiict of
interests. My clients have conflicting interests." He was right. (He was right,
perhaps he had conflicting obligations.
I want to spend just a minute to briefly outline what the problem was
that Bob Mundheim posed to me, that in turn provided the focus for my
paper. The problem concerned a law firm that had a policy of encouraging
its associates to take on pro bono work. An associate comes to the firm with
a prospective client, a group of blacks who want to encourage employment
of blacks in your area. He has worked out a variety of tactics, of which a
particular company in the area (not your client) is the focus; and the tactics
stretch along a broad spectrum, ranging from making proposals at shareholders' meetings, to introducing legislation in the state legislature and perhaps bringing in administrative proceedings.
Then a general client of the firm calls up and expresses outrage at the
thought that the firmmight do this, saying that, while his firm is not involved
in any of these proceedings, exactly the same tactics could be used against
his firm, and that it is improper of you and your firm to act in that way.
I think the key to begin to deal with these questions is to examine first
of all the extent of the existence and the extent of the lawyer's obligation to
clients and prospective clients. It is my own view that, except in the rarest
case, the lawyer has no obligation to take on any particular client, including

Heinonline - - 3 3 Bus. Law. 1491 1977-1978

1492

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 33, March 1978

pro bono clients. So it seemed to me that the firm was free, if it so desired,
to bend its knee and do as its existing client wished.
A more interesting duet of questions, I think, is: what is the firm's obligation if it chooses, all other things being equal, to take on the pro bono client,
and what is the extent of its obligations to the existing client.
I think that, in order to deal with that question, one has to look very
closely, in effect, at the lawyer's engagement, i.e., his engagement with the
existing client, because the extent to which we will accord legitimacy to a
client's claim of loyalty or a client's claim that a lawyer is acting disloyally
is a function of the kind of relationship the lawyer has with the client. It
seems very clear to me that if the relationship is an isolated one and the
lawyer is just doing a particular piece of litigation or handling a particular
financing or real estate transaction or any other isolated transaction, then
the client's legitimate claim is a relatively narrow one and is basically confined to having the lawyer not act directly against that client, e.g., not suing,
nor against the general subject matter of the work the lawyer is doing.
The situation is quite different, I think, in the case of a general client,
where the range of advice the lawyer gives is very broad; stretches over a
variety of issues; the relationship between the client and the firm being multilayered and the product of years of crises, events and problems, successes
and failures. There I think that the client's claim, i.e., the client's right to say
that his lawyer ought not to be working against his interests, is much broader.
Which leaves open the question of the limits, even of that claim. In order to
approach that question, what I have tried to do is to outline some categories
of issue conflicts or positional conflicts for which I do not claim any validity.
But I think they are a useful way to begin to think about some of these problems, and I thought I might spend just a minute and outline them for you.
At one end of the spectrum are the obvious cases and the traditional kinds
of conflicts of interest: You cannot represent both sides in a litigation; You
cannot represent a dissident share holder at a share holders' meeting of
your client; You cannot take direct action against your client.
I would put in basically the same category situations where what is involved is a specific regulatory scheme that has special application to your
client, and there are lots of examples of that. For example, it seems to me
that a lawyer ought not to be working in an area of strip mining legislation
or regulation that is antithetical to the interests of his mining client. Broker
dealer regulation is another example.
I contrast that with what I will call the general regulations, which are
ordinarily tax matters, SEC 1933 Act matters, things l i e ERISA. Now,
general regulations may be specific in a case of particular clients. If your
client is the trust department of a bank, then ERISA takes on a very different
kind of a cast. It seems to me that in this area a general client, at least, has
the right to say that you ought not to be working against his interests. In
the area of general regulation I think he has no speciiic claim on you.
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A related area is what many people call issue con£licts: the case where a
lawyer is obligated or 'finds himself in a position where he is taking the
opposite side of an issue of law for different clients. In my mind this is the
most difficult and subtle of all these problems, and one in which my mind
changes most often.
It seems to me that, if possible, a lawyer ought to avoid, if he can, being
put in that position. Accordingly he ought not to take on new clients if it is
foreseeable (i.e., reasonably foreseeable) that he is going to be in the position
of asserting on behalf of that client a position which is contrary to a position
he asserts on behalf of another client. I feel the same way about things which
are less directly related to clients, e.g., law review articles. I think a lawyer
has to think long and hard before he writes a law review article on a particular issue of concern to his client in which he comes to a conclusionperhaps even in which he comes to any conclusion-but certainly in which
he comes to a conclusion antithetical to his client's interests. As I am sure all
of you know, that is a problem that raises particular internal management
problems in a firm,because it takes a long time for associates to come around
to that point of view.
On the other hand, I think all of us have had the experience of being in
the course of general representation of a client, in a situation where you are
required to take a position which, though opposite to a position you are
actually taking for another client, is clearly antithetical to their interests.
Most general law firms represent both lenders and borrowers. And lenders
and borrowers have different interests in the outcome of issues concerning
the validity of security instruments,. different interests in most bankruptcy
issuea.
I think in those cases that a client is, in effect, held to have accepted that
risk and has to recognize the fact that a general law firm represents many
clients and cannot step down simply because a result may be one that is
hurtful to another client or even that client's industry.
Lastly, on what I have called the other end of the spectrum are client's,
in effect, disagreement with the social views represented by the causes
espoused by either the firm or its client. And here I think that, in terms
of what I call these narrow rules, a client has no claim on the lawyer: that
a lawyer is at least ethically free to do whatever he chooses. I think he is
also ethically free in terms of these rules to say, "My economic interests lie
with your social interests, and I will do as you say."
I view that as a human problem and not a professional one.
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Discussion by Participants and Panel:
PROF. MUNDHEIM: Steve's discussion raises another aspect of our
public responsibility as lawyers. Jerry Kurtz, the new Commissioner of Internal Revenue, lamented in an interview last week the fact that tax lawyers
were not providing comments on proposed regulations. H e thought their
reticence stemmed from the view that it would be unethical for them to give
comments because the regulations would impact on their clients in a very
specific way.
How do you view our ability to do bar association work which affects our
clients? We do a lot of it. Do we leave our clients at the door? Do we bring
them in, but say to the world, "You know, I am here purporting to do bar
association work, but actually I am here representing my client"?
MR. FRIEDMAN: I think, Bob, that it depends. I gather that this was
what was involved in Kurtz' remarks. I do not think that a lawyer has any
obligation to his clients not to make a legal system work properly, nor, simply
because it may be to a client's narrow economic interests, to allow a regulation to be defectively drafted that has a hole that you could drive a truck
through. I do not think that the lawyer has an obligation not to point that
out.
On the other hand, I am troubled by what I have called these areas of
specific regulations. As I think I told you on other occasions, it has been
my own experience on Securities Committees, for example, that lawyers tend
to act very differently in a broker dealer area than they act in the 1933 Act
area. In the broker dealer area it has been my experience that lawyers have
very much represented the interests of their clients, whereas in the 1933 Act
area, which is much more diffuse, they tend to pursue their own intellectual
analytical bents so long as there are no particular issues involved in which
they are otherwise dealing.
MR. WEINSTOCK: I think there is a disclosure problem here, and d
might say that I have occasionally sat in on gatherings which are more susceptible to the point of view of specific clients than this one has been. Occasionally I have been troubled by the fact that I had the impression that
when somebody was saying something, he really represented the viewpoint
of the client or himself as a special pleader. I do not think there is anything
wrong with that. Indeed, I think one of the ways in which our overall
system has worked as a practical matter has been that there are special
pleaders who are paid o r otherwise have an interest in pleading the way
they do.
As a matter of fact, we, as lawyers, should be no strangers to that process.
But the danger comes when somebody expresses an intellectual view, when
he says, "This is what I think is the best vim," but fails to say, "By the way,
you ought to know that this is very important to my client, and he is going
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to be very unhappy if this view is not adopted." Once he has said that, I think
it is very definitely a useful part of the overall process because when a regulation comes out, whether it is an SEC or a proposed regulation of any government bureau, it is less than perfect; and if the lawyers who represent private
clients are not going to be free to criticize, who will do the necessary job
in that respect?
MR. FRIEDMAN: Lou, let me respond. I think the thrust of what I am
saying is that it is more than a disclosure problem: that a lawyer may have
a professional obligation in that context to, in effect, represent the interests
of his client and not go the other way.
PROF. MUNDHEIM. The professional responsibility in your view is
limited to not joining a position which adversely affects the client. You are
not arguing that a lawyer has an obligation to argue his client's case in the
bar association discussion. It would be sufficient for him to say: "I can't
participate" in this problem.
MR. FRIEDMAN: What I am saying is that your range of choice on a
variety of substantive positions may be sharply limited. And, yes, it is partly
a disclosure issue in the sense you ought to tell the people with whom you
are pontificating about those limits. But it is also, I personally think, an
uncomfortable position to be in. For my own part I prefer to deal with issues
on which my range of choice is more free. I don't like being in that position.
MR. FLEISCHMAN: With the permission of Mr. Bialkin I would like
to tell those here who are not members of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities that this matter was discussed at some length at the last
committee meeting in Washington, less than a month ago. This has been a
live issue within the Committee of Federal Regulation of Securities, and it
was brought to the floor by the Chairman just a month ago.
I believe that the bottom line, as you put it, was that the committee or
at least those who were assembled there concluded that, to the very largest
extent possible, we do leave our client prejudices at the door when we attempt to respond to proposals by the SEC and other agencies. We come as
lawyers to these comment letters as objectively as we possibly can; and
therefore, with rare exceptions, it was the feeling of the committee assembled
there that we will not specifically draw attention to the fact that we may
have client interests which are adversely affected.
Those rare exceptions have come up in the past as Steve indicates, particularly in the broker dealer area. I had not focused as closely as Steve
apparently has on the fact that that area, in fact, has historically given us
the most trouble. But on reflection, I think that he is correct. I c a ~ oreally
t
account for that at this point.
I do not think that it is by any means limited to that area. As Steve indicates, perhaps it is because the legislation or regulation is a bit more specific
and biting or binding in the broker dealer area. But certainly I have a very
strong feeling, so far as that committee is concerned at least, that the lawyers
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who work on its comments to the federal agencies and to the Congress really
come to it on the best professional level that they can, having tried to the best
of their abilities to leave their client prejudices at the door.
PROF. MUNDHEIM: In that area where you recognize that it has been
very hard either for lawyers to leave their client interests at the door or,
where one accepts Steve Friedman's view, that it would be unethical to leave
them behind: was there thought as to whether you need only to disclose that
fact among yourselves during the discussion, or is there a need to inform
the general public about the interests of the lawyers who participated in the
formulation of the Bar Association's comments?
MR. FLEISCHMAN: The particular instance that comes to my mind,
after the introductory paragraph of the formalities that this is not a position,
was the very next paragraph, which stated, '?Please be aware that particularly
the draftsmen of this letter, not the whole Committee by any means, [but]
the draftsmen of this letter represent clients who would be adversely affected
by this proposed regulation."
MR. CREEDON: I think that the Bar Association Committee requires,
in submitting data to the House of Delegates, that there either be a statement
to the effect that the particular participants making the recommendation
have no particular interests that they are representing, or else there should
be some kind of disclosure. In many cases in the House of Delegates, a disclosure is made that someone has a certain affiliation and so forth.
PROF. MUNDHEIM. But that rule would not apply, for example, where
a committee or subcommittee makes a comment directly to a public body.
MR. CREEDON: I guess that has never been really explored. Maybe
it should be.
PROF. MUNDHEIM: One of the purposes of this conference is to raise
those kinds of issues for explora,tion.
MR. HERSHMAN: A good many years ago this issue came up before
the Association of the Bar of the State of New York in connection with
the Tax Committee, because tax acts are notoriously the consequences
of issues of special pleadings. The conclusion was that they simply must
check their interests at the door; and traditionally the members of the Tax
Committee have acted that way, even though their conclusions in many
instances were adverse to the interests of clients of particular committee
members.
MR. FRIEDMAN: I would like to push that just a bit. The insurance
coinpanies have a special system of taxation, and I am interested. You
would be very miffed if a firm with which you have had long and extensive
dealings, or a leading partner of that firm, took a strong publlc position in
favor of a substantially more onerous system of regulation of insurance
companies than you would if he took a position on, say, capital gains tax.
Or are insurance companies so special it is hard to think of something general that also applies to insurance companies?
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MR. HERSHMAN: You are making the cheese a little binding, but as a
member of the Bar Association Committee, no, I think I could not.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Is that because the responsibility is more diluted
there?
MR. HERSHMAN: That is right. It is representative of a profession,
professional views and not just the views of that particular committee member.
SPEAKER: Bob, one further comment in response to what Steve said
from the point of view of securities regulations. There are issues, and they
are not infrequent, where proposed regulations are susceptible of some
loyalty analysis, basically economic in focus. In many instances the subcommittees of the Federal Securities Regulation committee simply refuse
to participate in what might otherwise be a normal process of response. We
have no obligation to resp0r.d and where, as Mendes puts it, the cheese gets
binding, i.e., where the pocketbook is involved on both sides of the issue, we
do not respond.
PROF. MUNDHEIM: I might say that the Subcommittee on Market
Structure has pretty uniformly taken that position.
SPEAKER: I wonder if a relevant distinction is between cases when the
lawyer himself is identified publicly as taking a position and where he is a
participant on a committee, the committee taking a position.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, I think that is an important distinction.
SPEAKER: One other point. If a lawyer works on a committee, does
he have an obligation to discuss with the affected clients the position he may
take in that committee. Even if he were free to take a position which may
be adverse, he has a communication problem with his client.
MR. FRIEDMAN: You mean you have an obligation to warn him that
v
it is coming?
SPEAKER: Yes. I mean you are taking an adverse position. D o you
tell him that the committee is going to discuss this and that maybe he would
like someone else to support his views?
M R . FRIEDMAN: I would not think so.
SPEAKER: How d o you reach the possible conclusion that maybe you
cannot even take an adverse position, but then you say, "Well, if you can, you
don't even need to discuss it."?
MR. FRIEDMAN: Because as I told Bob last night, I keep changing my
mind about all these issues at a rapid rate, and I am not bound by my own
mistakes even of five minutes ago; because I really view this essentially as
a negative thing in which, in effect, we are saying to a client: "Yes, you have
got the rightqo restrict me from doing things that I would otherwise do,
but I don't think that a lawyer has an obligation to actively represent his
client's interests in every phase of his personal life, and I view Bar Association activity as a personal thing." I do not think he has to look out for his
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client's interests at the Bar Association. I think he may have some obligation
not to publicly take positions that are directly contrary.
SPEAKER: Say he generally represents an insurance company. The ABA
is now considering whether or not to advocate a special tax burden for
insurance. As a part of your general representation you ought to advise your
client of what is going on and how it may be affected.
MR. F~RIEDMAN:Oh, sure, but that is really saying, "Look, this Committee is doing something that affects your interests. You had better get
somebody there." It is a very different thing.
MR. SOMMER: I really think it is a disclosure problem. I agree with
what Lou suggested before: I am not sure that we can really separate ourselves from our client's interests, either emotionally or intellectually. I think,
particularly when we get involved in something, whether on a personal level
or pleading a cause for a client, that may take a large amount of our time,
it is sometimes very difficult for us to separate that. And I think that at the
front end there is a need to disclose because I am not sure-while I think
probably when we get comments that members of the Commission staff are
probably aware of some of the client interests, so to speak, that individuals
may be representing-I am not sure that the public appreciates that. These
are public comments, and I am not sure that there is not a need to disclose.
It would be as if I were to appear before Congress and say, "I am testifying as a member of the Bar who practices before the Securities and Exchange Commission, and I think that the Commission ought to have a
larger budget and a bigger office building," without disclosing to the Congress
that I work there, and am personally interested in the outcome. I think, to
some extent, that there is a need to disclose. I am not sure that it goes much
beyond that, but I think that, particularly since most of these comments
are public and are disseminated, there is a need to alert the public to this.
If you like, it may be a mosaic of institutional biases or intellectual biases
that come about as a result of our background and representation.
MR. EVANS: Is this a negative prohibition, or an ethical obligation, or
is it really just good client relations? I gather, Steve, that you think it is an
ethical obligation. If so, what do you point to in the Code that would say
that? Is it Canon 9-the avoidance of the appearance of impropriety?
MR. FRIEDMAN: I am going to avoid the question this way. It seems
to me that the undertaking we are really engaged in here is to try to apply
notions of conflict of interest or conflict of obligation to a series of situations
where they have not been applied before in a formal sense. What I tried to
suggest was that I think that we are going toward a reformulation of the
formal rules, perhaps even of the disciplinary rules of the notions of conflict
of interest or conflict of obligation. It will encompass some of these situations. Now, I do not think, that one can focus on appearance of impropriety.
That certainly covers some of these things, but I think that an ethics com-
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mittee would be hard put today to conclude that anyone had violated a
disciplinary rule in a lot of these areas.
What I am suggesting is that the claim of clients in some of these areas is
a legitimate one, and to extend its legitimacy ought to be a professional
obligation. It is also, obviously, good client relations. The reason it is good
client relations, what we really mean when we say that, is that it is an
important element of the lawyer-client relationship; and that, in a sense, is
what a lot of the Code of Professional Responsibility is about. It is about
the way lawyers ought to act for their clients, and that is what we are discussing.
PROF. MUNDHEIM: I noticed in the draft of Lloyd Cutler's talk that
was handed out it is suggested that Steve Friedman's position on positional
conflicts would divide us into a plaintiff's and defendant's bar. I also gather
Lloyd thought that the result would be basically unhealthy.
MR. CUTLER: I do think that it is unhealthy. It seems to me that, on the
issue that you have just been discussing, I think ethically the lawyer is perfectly free to take any position he wants provided, as Mr. Sommer suggested,
he discloses his interest; but he certainly ought to be free to take a position
that may be adverse to some of his client's general interests that he does not
happen to represent.
MR. FRIEDMAN: How about a specific interest?
MR. CUTLER: If he represents a specific interest of the client in a case,
or if it is a matter of continuing advice, I suppose he has a duty to not take
a conflicting law suit or a conflicting matter in which, if he is successful
in advocating an opposite position, it would hurt the first client. But I
should think he is entirely free to take a position as a member of the bar
as to what he thinks. That it may cost him the client is certainly true; but
he has, certainly, the ethical freedom to say what he thinks, even though the
client may decide he wants another lawyer. But I think most clients will
not want another lawyer.
In one particular case you described, the associate takes on a racial discrimination employment case. Well, we have had that situation. We have
taken a number of those cases, even though we also have clients who are
employers who we have represented in the employer racial discrimination
context. We have never had any such client say to us, "We object to your
doing that."
MR. FRIEDMAN: Lloyd, as I am sure you know, 1 came to the same
conclusion.
MR. CUTLER: I realize that.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Let me press you one step, if I can. Suppose what
you had done was design a very creative financing mechanism for a client,
in which they had billions of dollars of financing resting, and then one of
your partners wanted to write a law review article that pointed out that this
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sort of deal was probably invalid under some provision of the bankruptcy
law?
MR. CUTLER: Or wanted to testify before the Congress to get the law
changed'!
MR. FRIEDMAN: That would be prospective, which is a little different.
MR. CUTLER: I would think since your partner is, in effect, bound by
the opinion you gave, that unless he has a sincere recantation and the full
firm does, that it presents a conflict. I would agree. But there is almost never,
it seems to me, that kind of a case, in part because lawyers become advocates,
and they almost always tend to take the positions of the people they represent.
PROF. MUNDHEIM: But that is not necessarily true when you take the
case of the associate who has not been sufficiently indoctrinated. Is he also
bound?
MR. CUTLER: You get into another subject there. The way we try to
run pro bono cases, as I will get to later, a partner is always responsible for
that case. It is just like any other case in the office. It is subject to exactly
the same conflict rules, and the new associate is indoctrinated with the
problems of the law firm and who are its clients from the day he gets there.
PROF. MUNDHEIM: I was thinking of the law review article because
I have had a number of young graduates of our law school come back and
say, "You will never believe what has happened to me: they won't let me
publish that article."
MR. CUTLER: Of course, I suppose from the standpoint of canons of
ethics, you cannot distinguish between the partner and the associate. But I
should think I would hesitate a long time, and have to have a very clear
case of true conflict and ethical breach, before we would say to an associate
or a partner that he cannot write that article.
I also think, and I think this is what you asked me in the beginning,
Bob, that we ought to try to avoid as much as we can the notion that we are
not only specialists in a field, but specialists on one side of a field. It seems
to me we should be just as iilling to take plaintiffs antitrust cases as defendant's antitrust cases, to sue on one side of section lob-5 as well as to
defend on the other side. That is vital to a sense of self-respect and public
respect for the entire profession.
SPEAKER: Does it have any bearing that, in many cases, clients do not
object to their firm dealing with the needs of other clients, even though those
activities may have some adverse effect on them.
MR. CUTLER: It has certainly been our experience that the great majority of corporate clients are extremely tolerant of that kind of conflict and
largely leave the issue up to the lawyer. It is very, very rare, at least in our
experience, to feel you need a consent or an acquiescence from an earlier
client, or that the earlier client will say, "No, we don't want you representing
him."
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MR. FRIEDMAN: I think we have very different kinds of practices.
MR. CUTLER: Perhaps so.
MR. FRIEDMAN: That has not been my experience at all, and I think
that I know many clients who have been very unreasonable about being
uncomfortable with our representing competitors. It has to do, I think, with
the intimacy of the relationship between a lawyer and a general client, a very
complex human relationship.
PROF. MUNDHEIM: Which raises the following point. You premised
the ethical obligation on expectations, and expectations are subject to educative processes. If your cilents have those kinds of expectations you can
ask whether they ought to be re-educated. That is Lloyd Cutler's point. He
says that if clients have those kinds of expectations it produces an unhealthy
situation within the bar. I suppose that is the next level of the question.
MR. FRIEDMAN: I think it is a matter of degree. Obviously what we
are talking about is designing the lawyer-client relationship. Most of what 1
did when I gave my brief little speech was to describe what I thought was
characteristic of a relationship with a general client.
MR. WEINSTOCK: I think this example of the law review article is
illustrative of one of the problems we all have when we differ between what
we say are the standards of the bar and what a young man is apt to discover
when he comes into the office for the first time. I think we ought to observe
a distinction between on the one hand his right or lack of right to intellectual
freedom, i.e., to say anything he wants to, and on the other to put into print
something which harms a specific interest of a client-which really comes
down to a conflict of interest.
In the latter case the refusal to allow him to publish the article is certainly
not unethical on the part of the senior partner. In the former, I certainly
don't think it is unethical either, even though it is not the type of personality I would like to encourage in my own firm; because I think one of the
elements of personal morality is to allow young men to disagree with you,
even where it hurts when they disagree. So when the partner says, "You
cannot publish that article," although that may be undesirable conduct, I
do not think it is unethical.
MR. SMITH: A fairly recent case in New York is interesting in this very
area-an associate of a firm left that firm and filed a lawsuit that related to
issues of the bond counsel's former client. An objection was made of conflict
of interest that was represented by this young associate who felt very strongly
on public policy grounds about the position he was asserting. The trial court
judge said that he thought the objection was certainly a serious one that
should be considered. Howeyer, he thought the issue was of such importance
he wanted to go ahead and decide it, so he went ahead and decided it.
I do not know whether those issues are going up on appeal. A part of the
case is going up on appeal now in the case of Washburn against the Municipal Assistance Corporation, a case that is very relevant to this.
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PROF. MUNDHEIM: That raises another question. If there are ethical
obligations arising out of your relationship with a general client, how long
do they last? Suppose the general client leaves the firm. When can you begin
to take on matters that would adversely affect that client, laying aside matters in which that particular ex-client is the defendant in a litigation?
MR. FRIEDMAN: I would think immediately.
PROF. .MUNDHEIM: Does everybody agree that the problem abates
immediately?
MR. COONEY: No, Bob, I do not agree. I think the Third Circuit, at
least, has ruled quite contrary in at least one case where an associate in a
law firm had participated in an SEC investigation; the associate became
ipterested in the client, thought the management was great, and bought some
stock. A few years later the associate became disenchanted with the client
and brought a suit arising out of matters subsequent to the investigation.
The Third Circuit nonetheless barred the individual who sued per se from
participation in the proceeding, even as plaintiff or as counsel on the theory
that he may have learned some things about the company and its proclivities
and so forth that would affect overall the appearance of the fact that lawyers
are supposed to be dedicated to their clients.
PROF. MUNDHEIM: Is that case premised on the possible use of special
information received as a consequence of the lawyer's position?
MR. COONEY: No, not on specific information.
MR. FRIEDMAN: The former client is the defendant though. I was not
in the least suggesting you could sue him the day after he leaves your office,
but I am saying that . . .
PROF. MUNDHEIM: Taking your strip mining legislation case, the next
day a lawyer could actively participate in devising strip mining legislation
which he could not have done while representing the client?
MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes.
PROF. MUNDHEIM: And would you have the same feeling of freedom
for somebody to go to the government where they might be able to design
better strip mining legislation?
MR. COONEY: I have serious reservations.
MR. FRIEDMAN: I would like to talk about the question of going to
the government. I think, as I suggested in a footnote, I mean this in effect as
a kind of generally recognized exception to most of the rules in this area.
I mean, ex-government officials use the confidences and secrets of their client
all the time; and that is the reason they get good jobs. In the sense that, for
example, the knowledge gained from government service, if analogized to
the knowledge gained from serving one client, which is clearly prohibitedif the situation were two private clients, it would clearly prohibit the lawyer
from acting as here, but the series of restrictions are much narrower in the
case of the government, and there is a good public policy reason for that.
PROF. MUNDHEIM: In your view the notion of responsibility based on
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expectation only hold as long as the client relationship remains. That would
be a curious result unless there are sharp restrictions on resigning a client.
MR. CUTLER: The Code comes out exactly the opposite on the former
government lawyer. Anyone else who switches sides or whose client leaves
him has an obligation relating to client confidences, as was just mentioned.
But the former government lawyer has this further obligation about doing
anything that would give the appearance of switching sides on a.particular
matter. I think the former government lawyer is clearly subject to a much
stricter test than someone else's former lawyer.
SPEAKER: It does not even have to be a side switching lawyer. Under
Canon 9 you can be on the same side if you leave the government, and if it
is the same matter you are out.
?,
MR. FRIEDMAN: What I am talking about is, for example, before the
Freedom of Information Act, when all the internal procedures of the Internal
Revenue Service that are now public were not public, so that knowledge of
the way the government works, the way the Service works or the Treasury
works is very important knowledge for a tax lawyer who is dealing with the
government or advising a client.
I mean the knowledge of what is in the Field Agent's Manual (or so I think
it is called) is critical for an accountant who is filling out tax returns; as I
understood it the Code did not reach that problem at all, and it would clearly
do so in the case of an individual client. I mean those would be confidences
of Internal Revenue Service, and you could not begin to advise anyone else
on matters in which that touched at all.
MR. SMITH: Bob, I think we should not let go the problem of the lawyer
going into the government and what he can do there. I think it should be
very clearly stated that once you take that oath of office in the government
you should be calling the shots the way you see them, whether they are advea: to the general interests of former clients or not; that if you do anything
less than that you are doing less than the oath of office.
PROF. MUNDHEIM: I think that is generally true. The question is
whether or not you have got to exclude yourself from serving with respect to
certain matters, or whether to even take the job in the first place because it
involves particular problems which will adversely affect present clients. Is
there an ethical proscription on those points?
The other point I want us to discuss relates to walling off parts of a firm
from each other. Steve Fried'man thinks that the firm has to be viewed as
one entity. I worry about that conclusion at a time when law firms are going
national. Law firms have branch offices separated geographically by the
whole country and in some cases by oceans. Add law firms partially amalgamating by having one or two joint partners. Are we stuck with the imputation rule in all of these cases? If we are talking about client expectations
can we devise procedures for walling off and advise clients that we have wall-
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ing off procedures and that therefore their expectations about imputations,
if they have them, are unreasonable?
MR. FRIEDMAN: You know, in a way a more interesting aspect of that
question is the implication of what you are suggesting for law firms and the
way they organize themselves. I think that the firms I know, including my
own, that are examining a question of other offices are very concerned in
part about conflicts, and there have been some recent notorious, horrible
examples of problems.
MR. CUTLER: I would not want to do anything to help the formation
of national law firms, but I do think it is pdssible to wall off. It is not just
walling off-it is walling off with the consent, of course, of the former client
or the other client, including the government.
There is a case within the last month, as I noted in my paper. The Court
of Claims has now come down four square, Lew, in favor of Opinion 342
and the absolute need to have the government capable of giving its consent
to practice before the government by the partners or associates of a former
government lawyer who is walled off, subject to the supervision of the court
to step in wherever it thinks there is still an impropriety.
SPEAKER: Our firm has offices that are separated by oceans, and we
find that the expectations of clients are entirely different when offices that
are widely separated are involved. They are entirely different, at least in our
experience, than when a matter may come up in one office; and when you
discuss these kinds of conflicts with those clients, we find them to be quite
reasonable, at least in our terms.
MR. CUTLER: There is such a case right now, you know, involving the
Kirkland and Ellis firm who are counsel for Westinghouse in the uranium
cases, including the antitrust case against the foreign uranium companies
in Chicago. Their Washington office was counsel for the American Petroleum
Institute in defending against the proposed legislation that would keep oil
companies out of the uranium business.
In the course of that case, their Washington office went to Kerr McGee,
a member of the API, and allegedly acquired various kinds of confidential
information about Kerr McGee's uranium business. Kerr McGee is a defendant in Westinghouse's Chicago case and moved to strike Kirkland
and Ellis as counsel for Westinghouse on that ground, and the court has that
case under advisement right now in Chicago.
MR. SCHNEIDER: I have had a variation of the problem come up. Suppose again the hypothetical where you devise some kind of a very clever
financing plan. Another client wants to use that method of doing business.
Let us assume it is not proprietary. It is reflected in public documents that
are fded with the SEC and somebody else wants to use it. You spent six
months working on it with no action letters in your research in your plan
for the first person. Can you use it for another client?
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MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, I would think that in the ordinary case, the answer is certainly yes, and firms do it all the time.
MR. CUTLER: The real question is: can you charge as much the second
time.
MR. BIALKIN: On that last question, I do not think the answer is quite
as simple as Steve suggests, because it may be that the effort of the law firm
provided a special benefit to the client for whom the matter was devised and
giving that benefit, even though it would otherwise be separately devised
for a separate client could minimize the benefit to the first client. For example, we had an experience last year when, on behalf of a particular client,
we obtained a particular kind of ruling from the Treasury Department which
permitted a particular company to engage in a particular kind of conduct
which gave it a competitive advantage in its industry. The ruling became
public, and another client asked us whether we could obtain a similar ruling
for them.
The obtaining of that ruling could be done by any law firm, except we had
applied once. We knew the considerations of the agency. We knew the kinds
of submissions of presentations of facts that could facilitate it. But we felt
that we could not do .that without consulting the first client, even though it
was a free country; and the first client objected to our seeking a ruling on
behalf of the second client and in effect using the forms devised for the first
client, since it felt that another company coming in and having the same
opportunity could adversely affect its market. In that case we did not accept
the assignment, even though I suppose within the framework of your answer
we could have.
MR. FRIEDMAN: I agree with that. I mean, there are cases where you
have done something so special, and there is a major competitive edge.
MR. BIALKIN: Even though it is in the public domain, you can do it;
but you cannot do it because you helped your client to an advantage. I
think you . . .
MR. FRIEDMAN: The municipal bond client, it seems to me is a kind
of example where applications were pending for years.
MR. BIALKIN: It was not on a case but . . .
MlR. FRIEDMAN: But it is the same. I mean, that seems to me the kind
.
of example where there are serious problems.
DEAN REDLICH: I just want to mention that for six years I was editor
in chief of the Tax Law Review. I never knew of a single case where an
article came to us in which the lawyer identified the fact that some position
that he was advocating in the article would redound to the benefit of a client.
There were innumerable cases where I would ask lawyers to write on a particular subject, and they informed me that they could not do so because the
position they might like to take was one which was adverse to positions in
the firm, i.e., positions of clients in the firm, so that there seems to be a oneway street on the way this operates, at least among tax lawyers.
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